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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Status of Preparations for Foreign
Ministers' Conferences

There is enclosed a report on the status of our preparations for the forthcoming Foreign Ministers' meetings, first with the Allied Foreign Ministers in Paris beginning April 29 and then with the Soviets in Geneva beginning May 11. This is necessarily an interim report since the Western position for the conference with the Soviets is still being worked out by the Quadripartite Working Group on Germany now meeting in London.

/S/ CHARLES A. HEETER

Acting Secretary

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Subject: Status of Preparations for Foreign Ministers' Conferences.

The U.S. positions on the major elements of the problems relating to Germany, Berlin and European security have been reviewed and coordinated in the light of the views expressed in the recent Foreign Ministers' conference and the NATO Ministerial Council meetings here in Washington. These revised U.S. positions are now being put forward by our members of the Quadripartite Working Group in London, preparatory to reaching a coordinated Western position which we hope will be finalized during the meeting in Paris with the British, French and German Foreign Ministers late this month.

In reviewing these positions we have in general been guided by the following major considerations:

1. Chances of agreeing with the Soviets on a German settlement within the foreseeable future are practically nil; consequently while our proposals must be such that we could, in fact, live with them if they were accepted, the principal result we can expect is an improvement in our international posture. Therefore, our proposals must appeal to public opinion by being readily understandable and reasonable, and thus convincing testimony to our readiness to negotiate in good faith on unsettled international problems.
2. Our proposals should follow the general line of the Western proposals at Geneva in 1955 but with appropriate changes to reflect present realities and to make them more easily understandable.
3. Our proposals should be included in a package inter-relating progress toward German reunification and security measures with no elements separable, except possibly Berlin.
4. In the last analysis the German position must necessarily be determining since it is basically the German future which is at stake.

In general our Allies seem to agree with the foregoing line of reasoning and with the phased step approach which we have put forward. However, there are considerable differences as regards particular elements and as regards tactics.

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The French and Germans are still firm and determined with respect to the Berlin problem but the British would probably accept arrangements seriously weakening our position rather than face the risk of hostilities. We shall have to stiffen them. The Germans are indecisive about steps toward reunification and shaken by the recent Adenauer decision. We shall have to try to pull them along. The French are opposed to any UN participation and reluctant to put forward within the German context any important elements of our security and disarmament proposals. We can probably reason with them.

A full set of the interdepartmentally agreed U.S. position papers is being sent to General Goodpastor for your reference. There will probably be considerable modifications of these positions resulting from the Working Group and Foreign Minister level consultations now in progress with our Allies. However, I shall make every effort to preserve the general lines and essential features.


The basic elements of the U.S. position are, in brief summary:

1. German Reunification

The U.S. position contemplates a phased approach to reunification.

Stage I would consist of agreement in principle on a phased plan for German reunification, European security, and a German peace settlement, and the establishment of a US-UK-French-USSR commission of consultation and conciliation.

Stage II would be a three-year transitional and adjustment period in which the first steps toward reunification would be taken through the creation of an all-German Commission and the development of free movement of persons, ideas, and publications throughout Germany. The Commission would be composed of two delegates from each of the ten states (Laender) of the Federal Republic and the five former states of the Soviet Zone. It would reach decisions by a two-thirds majority. The Commission, acting as agent of the Four Powers and having no executive authority, would draft an electoral law, a law for a provisional all-German government, and an all-German constitution and coordinate non-political contacts between the parts of Germany.



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Stage III would bring the accomplishment of reunification through approval of the draft constitution by a plebiscite, and election of an all-German Assembly on the basis of free, internationally supervised elections, and the establishment of a provisional all-German authority.

In Stage IV, a peace treaty would be concluded by the provisional all-German government and the states which had been at war with the former German Reich.

2. German Peace Treaty

A German peace treaty should be negotiated by a truly representative all-German government and those states which bore the principal burden of the war against Germany. The treaty should reestablish Germany as a sovereign state enjoying a normal position in the community of nations and resolve issues still remaining from the war. Contrary to the Soviet proposals, the treaty should be non-punitive and non-interventionist.

3. European Security

The U.S. European security proposals constitute a phased plan which is to come into effect in step with the reunification plan described above. The implementation of all disarmament measures would be conditional upon the establishment of inspection systems to verify compliance.

In Stage I the Four Powers should issue a common declaration confirming their interest in maintaining the peace and establishing a mechanism for consultation to implement the arrangements agreed on.

In Stage II, the three year transitional period, the exchange of information on military forces in a "special security area" (comprised of Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and possibly Hungary) should be undertaken. The Four Powers should also limit their forces (U.K. and France each 750,000; U.S. and U.S.S.R. each 2,500,000) and store agreed quantities and types of armaments under the supervision of an international control organization.

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The Four Powers should also negotiate further forces and armaments limitations to become effective in Stage III, subject to the progress of other forces and armaments limitations. Measures of inspection and observation against surprise attack could also be undertaken in parts of Europe, the Arctic, Siberia, and North America. The countries of the Special Security Area would undertake not to produce chemical, bacteriological, or nuclear weapons.

In Stage III, upon the establishment of an all-German government, agreed ceilings (to be negotiated) should be put into effect on the total number of non-German NATO and Soviet effective combat forces in the Special Security Area. If satisfactory progress were made, the Four Powers should then further reduce their forces in two stages. (UK and France to 650,000; US and USSR to 1,700,000) The forces of other "essential" states would be reduced at the same time.

In Stage IV, after conclusion of the peace treaty, no party should station forces in any country of the Special Security Area except with the consent of the country involved. If Germany chose to become a member of a security system, there might be special measures relating to forces and installations in the parts of the Special Security Area which lay closest to the frontier of Germany and the countries which are members of another security system. Under these circumstances, the Four Powers should also be prepared to undertake additional mutual obligations along the lines of the Geneva Treaty of Assurance and to give an assurance that they would not advance their forces beyond the former line of demarcation between the two parts of Germany.

4. Berlin

A change in the status of Berlin might be considered in the context of Four-Power agreement on a plan to deal with the underlying problem of the division of Germany. Thus the Western Powers should propose that, during Stage II of the reunification and security plan, Berlin should be reunited through free elections under United Nations supervision, the "capital of the German Democratic Republic" should be removed from Berlin, a plebiscite should be held under United Nations supervision to determine whether and what foreign troops

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should remain in Berlin, and the presence and free access of these troops should be guaranteed. Berlin would become the capital of a united Germany in Stage III.

If forced into separate consideration of the Berlin question because of Soviet refusal to discuss a General settlement of the German problem, the U.S. contemplates a series of positions which could, if necessary, be taken in sequence. All involve a change in the status of Berlin. The earlier ones would be designed to improve the Western posture in Berlin, the subsequent ones to maintain a situation at least as satisfactory as that now existing. If all of these proved unnegotiable, the Berlin access issue would have to be faced squarely on the basis of existing contingency planning.

5. Tactical Questions

(a) Approach to Soviets

The U.S. assumes that the Soviet Foreign Minister is not likely to engage in serious negotiations at the May meeting and that there may be a Summit conference after the Foreign Ministers' meeting. The May 11 meeting will thus be largely a public relations exercise and an attempt to formulate an adequate summit agenda in terms the Soviets will find it difficult to reject. The main elements of the Western position on Germany and European security should probably be made clear to the public before the May meeting. In the May meeting, the Western Powers should table the Western plan, as an inseparable package, and insist that the conclusion of a peace treaty and the solution of the Berlin problem both require German reunification. With respect to a possible summit formula, a broad agenda should be sought, allowing either side to raise any issue it considers relevant under three broad headings: (1) a European peace program, including the settlement of questions relating to Germany and European security; (2) disarmament and related measures; and (3) other topics.

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(b) German Participation

German participation in the Foreign Ministers Conference is likely to become an issue. The US position is that the Western Powers should insist that the basic legal responsibility for the solution of the matters before the conference rests with the Four Powers. German participation should therefore be limited to each side consulting with each German contingent in the course of the meetings. If German delegates are present at the meetings they should be seated in a way which clearly indicates they are not participants and they should not directly participate by speaking at the meetings.

(c) Other Participation

The Western Powers should at the outset insist that the conference be limited to the Four Powers with special responsibilities for the German question. The principle of parity of representation should in no case be conceded. If the Soviet Union continues to press for the participation of Czechoslovakia and Poland, however, the Western Powers should have a fall-back position in order to avoid the charge that they are responsible for a collapse of negotiations on procedural grounds.

This fall-back position would be to name other countries, e.g., Italy, The Netherlands, and Benelux, on the ground that they have as valid a claim to participate as do Poland and Czechoslovakia. If Poland and Czechoslovakia participate, the Western Powers must honor their commitment to support Italian participation. It would be preferable to limit these countries to observer status, but if necessary, they might be allowed full participation. If the Soviets then press for the participation of Rumania, the Western Powers should counter that the participation of all countries with an equivalent interest would not be conducive to serious negotiations. The composition of the Foreign Ministers' meeting should not constitute a precedent for a summit meeting.

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